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WHYISINFLATION SKEWED?
A DEBT AND VOLATILITY STORY
A B STR ACT
This paper studiesthe patterns of inflationskewness in 56 countries. Monthly data
suggests that inflation is posicively skewed. We investigate linkages between skewness and non-
linearity, showing that concavity (convexity) will lead to negative (positive) skewness if the
independentvariable is symmetrically distributed. Weconstruct a public finance model for a
developing country that uses inflation tax and external borrowing as the residual means for fiscal
financing. The model predicts a convex dependency of inflation on output. whem inflation
skewness depends positively on inflation volatility, and external debt difficulties magnify the
skewness. We conclude the paper with an assessment of the patterns of inflation between 1979-
1993 for the 56 countries. Overall, the patterns are consistent with the predictions of the model.
Joshua Aizenman Ricardo Hausmann
Department of Economics Inter-American Development Bank
Dartmouth College 1300 New York Avenue, NW
6106 Rockefeller Hall Stop W0304
Hanover, NH 03755 Washington, DC 20577
and NBERRecent decades have been turbulent for Latin American countries and other
developing countries, a period associated with high and volatile inflation, terms of trade
instability, and external debt problems. A question that deserves further attention is the
impact of the resultant volatility on macroeconomic performance. Recent studies have
shown that macroeconomic volatility impacts negatively on investment and growth.'
The economic explanation for these patterns, however, deserves further investigation.
The purpose of this paper is to focus narrowly on one aspect of volatility -its
impact on patterns of inflation. Figure 1 plots the volatility/skewness patterns of
monthly inflation in a sample of 56countriesduring the period of 1979-1993. 2TableI
summarizes the avenge skewness, variance and the mean of inflation rates and inflation
tax rates, demonstrating that inflation is positively skewed. 3,Our paper will trace
possible economic reasons that explain this pattern.
In section 1 we identify the linkage between skewness and non-linearity. We
See Rodrick (1991), Barro (1991), Aizenman and Marion (1993), Flausrnann
(1994), Dornbusch and Edwards (1994) and the references therein.
2 Oursample was restricted by the availability of monthly data. It is composed of
18 OECD countries, and 38 developing countries.
3 Theinflation tax rate is defined by 11(1 +I),where I is the inflation rate. This ratio
measures the implicit tax rate imposed by inflation on money balances, and is bounded
between values close to zero and one. The advantage of focusing on the inflation tax
rate is that it is a stationary variable that has a simple public finance interpretation.
4 Theskewness reported in this study is defined by the third central moment
divided by the cube of the standard deviation. While inflation is positively skewed both
in the OECD countries and the developing countries, skewness is lower for the first
group --theaverage inflation skewness for OECD and developing countries is 0.92 and
1.7, respectively. The avenge inflation tax rate skewness for OECD and developing
countries is .868 and 1.02, respectively.Figure 1. Skewnessand Varianceof Inflation









Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.2
Table 1
Average statistics, 1979- 1993
Monthly data, 56 countries,Source: International Financial Statistics,IMF





Patterns of skewness across the 56 countries5
Inflation rate Inflation tax rate
I 11(1÷1)
Significantly negative 2 developing, 3 developing,
I OECD I OECD
Non significant skewness 7 developing, 9 developing
1 OECD 1 OECD
Significantly positive 29 developing, 26 developing,
I6OECD I6OECD
The confidence level reported in this table is 95%.3
showthatifan independent random variable is symmetrically distributed, concavity
(convexity) leadstoa negative (positive) skewness ofthedependent variable.
Insection 2 we describe a public finance model of inflation tax and external debt
that may lead to a convex dependency of inflation on output shocks. The model is
designed to account for several features specific to developing countries. We consider a
government that finances its activities and services its outstanding external debt by
direct taxes, printing money, and external borrowing. Future output is stochastic, and
the access of the country to the international credit market is limited by its
creditworthiness, which in turn is related to the tax capacity of the government.6 Both
inflation tax and external borrowing are assumed to be associated with excess burden.
We characterize the pattern of inflation and external borrowing, and derive the
association of inflation and output We show that if the tax capacity is large relative to
the needed fiscal resources, inflation rate will be low (possibly zero), and direct taxes will
be used to finance government expenditure. If the fiscal revenue needs exceed the tax
capacity, both the inflation tax and external borrowing will be used to finance current
fiscal outlays. Further increase in fiscal needs (or a drop in tax capacity) exhausts the
ability of the country to increase its external borrowing, as the credit ceiling is reached.
In these circumstances inflation tax is used as a residual means of taxation, leading to a
convex dependency of inflation on output. This convexity is magnified in the presence
of external credit ceilings, or a large accumulation of foreign debt.
6 Incountries where the private sector does not have access to the international
credit market, most external borrowing is either done by the government, or guaranteed
by it. Hence, the external debt should be viewed as a liability of the government, and
the tax capacity is one important indicator regarding the government's ability to service
its debt.4
Section3 turns to an empirical assessment of the skewness of inflation
throughout the last 15 years. Overall, the patterns are consistent with the predictions of
the model described in Section 2.
Before turning to the paper, it is useful to place it in the context of the relevant
literature. The importance of inflation tax as the residual means of financing is well
established in the existing literature.7 A topic that deserves further attention focuses on
the degree to which limited access to the international credit market affects inflation tax.
The skewness of price adjustments, in the presence of an inflationary trend, has been
derived in models that focused on menu costs and nominal rigidity.8 Our discussion
ignores menu cost factors, focusing instead on public finance aspects of inflation and
external debt as the residual means of financing government expenditure. While we do
not negate the potential importance of menu costs and nominal rigidities, these
considerations are not unique to developing countries. The linkages between output
volatility, inflation and external debt, however, are more pronounced for developing
countries, and may be crucial for explaining the patterns of inflation taking place in
these countries.9
On the optimality of using inflation tax as a residual, see Calvo and Guidotti
(1992), Calvo and Leiderman (1992) and the references therein.
8 SeeTsiddon (1991) and Ball and Mankiw (1994). In these models shocks that
raise firms desired relative price trigger larger price responses than shocks that lower the
desired relative price, as in the second case the inflation will reduce the relative price
without any nominal price adjustment.
Industrialized countries are well integrated with the international credit market,
and their tax system is well developed. Hence, they may be able to adjust to real shocks
without relying on the inflation tax.5
1.Skewness and non-linearity
Frequent applications of certainty equivalence in macroeconomics may induce
one to overlook the impact of non-linearity. The purpose of this section is to establish
the linkage between non-linearity and skewness when certainty equivalence does not
hold. A possible measure of skewness is the third moment of a function, defined by the
expected value of the cube difference between the function and its mean.
Consider the example provided in Figure 2, plotting a concave function y =f(x).
Suppose that x follows a symmetric three states distribution:



















Thecorresponding values of the function are
f(x0)+ ha2Probability 1/3
(2)x =f(x0) Probability 1/3
f(x0) —ha1Probability 1/3
where a1 and a2 are the slopes of y =f(x)between points (A & B) and (B & C),




where E is the expectation operator.
Had y =f(x)been a linear function (like NBC' in Figure 2), volatility would not
affect its mean (equals to f(x0)), and the third moment of f(x) would bezero. For a
concavefunction, however, volatility reduces the mean. This effect in conjunctionwith
thefact that point A is further below point B than point C is above B, induces a
negative third moment. Applying the logic of figure 2, it follows that for a convex
function, the skewness is positive. In Appendix A. we apply a second order Taylor
approximation showing that:
Claim 1:Let y =f(x)be a twice differential function, and let x be a random variable
distributed symmetrically around xij with a small support where f' Cv)0,then
sign E[{f(x) —Qf(x)]}3]= signf". Hence, concavity (convexity) is associated
with a negative (positive) skewness.7
2.Inflation skewness, productivity shocks and external debt.
We turn now to a public finance model that links output to inflation. The model
will enable us to predict the patters of non-linearity in the association of output and
inflation. The model is characterized by the following assumptions, motivated by the
experience of developing countries in recent decades:
Inflation tax and external borrowing are the residual means of financing
government expenditure, meeting any gap between the fiscal revenue needs and the
fiscal funding available from other sources.
• Other taxes (like income and sale taxes) are characterized by their relative rigidity
-thecosts of adjusting the tax rates to the realized state of nature are too high.
• Foreign borrowing is limited by the credit worthiness of the country, which in
turn is linked to its tax capacity. When the external credit ceiling is reached, the
inflation tax remains the only residual means of fiscal financing.
• Both the inflation tax and foreign borrowing are associated with excess burden.
We start with the construction of a simple framework capturing these
assumptions -amodel of a one traded good in a two period example. Appendix B
extends the logic of the model to a more general n period framework Ui ￿ 00).Tofix
ideas, we consider the case where all external borrowing is done by the government.
The outstanding foreign debt at the beginning of the first period is B1.Thedemand for
money is characterized by a cash in advance constraint:'0
10Allowing for a variable velocity will complicate exposition, but will not modify
the key results, as is illustrated in Appendix B. In fact, a negative dependency of the
demand for money on the inflation rate tends to increase the convexity of the inflation
output schedule (See Appendix B for further discussion).8
(4)
where M stands for nominal balances, P is the price level, and Qdenotesoutput. The
government has two means of taxation: the inflation tax, and a proportional income tax
at a rate of x.Throughoutthe analysis we take this tax as given, reflecting the fiscal
capacity of the government In addition, the government may have limited access to the
international credit market, borrowing D1 to be returned in period 2 with a contractual
interest rate R (denominated in foreign currency units). The access to the international
credit market and the contractual interest rate are determined by risk neutral creditors
who demand an expected return equal to the risk free rate, denoted by r.






where standsfor thenominalmoney balances 'inherited' from the previous period,
andstands for government expenditure on goods and services, assumed to be
exogenously given. The right hand side of (5) corresponds to the fiscal revenue net of
expenditure, being the sum of direct taxes, revenue from printing money, and external
borrowing, minus expenditure. Applying (4) and (5) we infer that
(5')B1 =Q1+k[Q1—Q0]+ir1kQ0÷D1—G1 =(+ k)Q1 —(1—,r1)kQ0+D1 -G19
P-P where = 0 isthe inflation tax, defined to be bounded between zero and one.
P1
We assume that inflation introduces deadweight losses, the consumption cost of which
is iQ(g)2 The coffesponding first period consumption (C) is given by:
(6)c=[l_x_k_(x1)21Q1+(1_,r1)kQ0.
The second period is modeled as the terminal period: at that period external debt
is settled. The consumption at that period equals the difference between production and
debt payment. To simplify presentation we assume that in the terminal period the
demand for money is zero. Appendix B extends the mode] to a general n period
framework. In addition to the cost of inflationary finance mentioned above, we assume
that external debt may induce deadweight losses, due either to adverse incentive effects
associated with debt overhang, or to more frequent spells of non-cooperative behavior.
Suppose that the only uncertainty in period 1 concerns the second period output.
There are two independent sources for this uncertainty: an exogenous and an
endogenous one. The exogenous uncertainty reflects the state of nature, being
determined by factors like weather, terms of trade, etc. We summarize this uncertainty
by a distribution f(Y2),wherestands for the potential output. The endogenous
uncertainty stems from the possibility of production disruption due to non-cooperative
behavior among domestic competing pressure groups (like labor and capital or other
potential rival groups). Or alternatively, due to a drop in effort induced by debt
overhang. We model this by assuming that non-cooperative behavior, or debt overhang,
will induce a percentage GNPdropof r, occurring with probability p. This probability
depends positively on the external debt burden:I0
(1+r)Dj (7)p=p(z), where z = , andp>O for z>O.
E(Y2)
The value of z measures the exposure of a country to external debt relative to the
anticipated output. The presumption is that a larger exposure increases the frequency of
production disturbances, due to several possible reasons. First, if external debt
accumulation leads to debt overhang, it will reduce effort resulting in a similar reduced
form equation. Alternatively, cooperation may be in short supply in bad times, leading
to spells of production disturbances due to conflicts among rivaling groups. A higher
debt burden is equivalent to an adverse shock, reducing the net resources available for
consumption or investment, and encouraging thereby opportunistic behavior.t2,13
1 For a discussion on debt overhang, see Krugman (1988), Classnes (1988) and the
references therein. See Berg and Sachs (1988) for a statistical analysis that highlights
the role of exposure to external debt in explaining rescheduling.
12The presumption is that adverse shocks will increase the benefit of opportunistic
behavior as it increases the marginal evaluate of extra resources and reduces the planing
horizon, diminishing the value of future penalties associated with non-cooperation. For
a model capturing these feature, see Aizenman (1993). For a war of attrition
interpretation of high inflation see Alesina and Drazen (1991).
13Another way for linking external debt with productivity disturbances is to
recognize that a partial default on external debt may lead to a drop in international trade
due to trade embargo or to the elimination of trade credits. In these circumstances, t
measures the output effects of a default, and p represents the default probability.11
Assuming that the resolution of both types of uncertainty occurs simultaneously,
the expected GNP equals:14
(8)E(Q) =(1—vp)E(1)
The sovereign debt is modeled in a manner akin to Helpman (1989). where the
country repays itsexternaldebt each period up to a fraction xofits GNP. where x
correspondsto the tax capacity.15 Hence, the supply of credit facing the country in
period one is determined by the condition:
(9) D1(1+r)=E[Min{(1+R)D1;%Q2)}.
This condition defines implicitly the supply of credit facing the country. The maximum
external credit supported by (9) defines the external credit ceiling, denoted by 1)3.
The expected second period consumption equals the difference between the
expected second period output and the expected external debt repayment:
(10)E{C2}=(l—'rp)E(Y2)—(1+r)D1
The representative consumer is risk neutral, discounting second period
consumption at a rate of r. The utility of the representative decision maker is given by:
14 A similar analysis applies if nature moves first, although the resultant equations
are more involved.
In this fonnulation we implicitly assume that creditors have the bargaining power
to induce the debtor to repay up to the tax capacity.12
(11) 14-r
The government sets the first period inflation tax and borrows so as to maximize
the expected net present value of consumption, subject to the proper constraints. This




+k)Q1 — k(1 — it1 )Q + — — B1 } +-
it1
Thepolicy maker determines the inflation tax and external borr owing so as to
maximize the expected utility of the representative agent subject to two constraints: the
government budget constraint (the multiplier of which is A, representing the shadow
cost of government expenditure), and the external credit ceiling (the multiplier of which
isp, representing the shadow benefit of extending the external debt ceiling).
There are three possible regimes. If the present tax capacity suffices to cover all
government outlays, the inflation tax will not be used (it1= 0),and any tax surplus will
be saved (leading to D1<0)16 Inthis regime, both external borrowing and inflation tax
are redundant. In the second regime tax capacity falls short of revenue needs. An
internal equilibrium is characterized by the optimal application of both inflation and
external borrowing. If the credit ceiling is not binding, the second regime is
16Equivalently,the government may rebate the excessive tax to the consumer.13
characterized by equating the marginal cost of both means of financing. Formally, this




Condition a. states that the cost of funding extra government expenditure is
proportional to the inflation rate. The proportionality factor is linked to the deadweight
losses stemming from the inflation taxP Condition b. equates the marginal cost of
raising revenue via both means of financing. The marginal cost of external debt equals
to the marginal increase in the probability of production disturbances, times the
percentage output drop induced by these disturbances.
If revenue needs are large enough to exhaust all the available foreign bonowing,
the credit ceiling is binding, leading to the third regime. In this case inflation tax is
residual, being determined by:
(14)1
Furtherinsight can be gained by imposing further restrictions on both the
stochastic process and the endogenous uncertainty. Suppose that the future potential
output follows an auto regressive process:
Note that the term in (13a) measures the excess burden of one dollar
QoI
raised by inflation tax.14
(15)
where £2isa white noise process. Thus, E[}]= vQ1
Letthe 'switching' probability follow a logistic function:
(16)p= s>O.
1+exp(s/z)
Parameter s captures the sensitivity of the switching probability with respect to the
anticipated burden of servicing the external debt. Applying this formulation to (13) we
infer that the internal equilibrium is characterized by
sexp(slz)I (17) r2T8'
{1+exp(s/z)}z
Applyingthe above conditions, we can summarized the three possible regimes
with the help of Figure 3, which plots the inflation tax against a first period output.
It1
1
Figure 3: Output-Inflation Schedule15
The position of the output-inflation curve depends on the outstanding debt, B1.
Point A (Figure 3) corresponds to the output level that induces inflation, switching from
the first to the second regime. Applying the budget constraint we infer that the output
G+B+kQb at point A is given by Q1= Hence,a larger external debt accumulatrnn
or a smaller tax capacity shifts point A to the right, from the solid curve to the dashed
one.18 A larger real interest rate applied to the debt induces a similar shift.
Figure 3 highlights the possibility that a rigid direct tax structure and the
exposure to country risk yields a non-linear, convex output/inflation association.
Applying our discussion from section 1 to Figure 3 enables us to conclude:
• If the independent variable is output, and if its distribution is symmethc around
the mean, a large enough volatility will lead to a positive skewness of inflation. The
resultant skewness increases with volatility.
- Debtaccumulation or a raise in the international interest rate will shift the curve
to the right, increasing thereby the convex region, and raising the inflation skewness.
• A higher anticipated output volatility leads to a higher expected inflation and
thereby to a higher interest rate.
Applying the first order conditions it can be shown that at point A
sta=0 .2k]>0
dQ116
3.Some evidence --inflationskewness and external debt
We turn now to evaluate some evidence regarding the impact of volatility and
external debt difficulties on inflation skewness. Ideally, one wishes to use the volatility
of GDP, termsoftrade, government revenue and all the other relevant variables to test
the model described above. Unfortunately, we do not have monthly information
regarding this variable. Instead, we proceeded indirectly. First, we used annual data to
investigate the skewness patterns of the real GDP of the 56countriesin the sample.
With the exception of one country, we can not reject the hypothesis that the real GDP is
not skewed.19 This result enables us to apply Figure 3 to infer that external debt
difficulties and higher volatility of inflation should increase inflation skewness.
Next, we proceeded by dividing the sample into three periods: before the debt
crisis (February 1979-July 1982), periods during the debt crisis (August 1982- December
1989) and the aftermath (January 1990-December 1993).
Table 2 reports a summary of the average values of monthly inflation skewness.
variance, and mean throughout the sample. Table 3 provides similar information for the
inflation tax rate. Overall, throughout the years characterized by the debt crisis, it is
evident that skewness, volatility and rates of inflation moved together, increasing
throughout the sample. While this is not a formal test of the model, these results are
consistent with the interpretation that the adverse shocks leading to the debt crisis
moved countries from the flat portion of the inflation-output schedule (Figure 3) to the
upward sloping convex part, where volatility induces skewness and where external
credit ceilings are worsening the inflationary impact of adverse real shocks. Our model
predicts that even if some countries regain limited access to the international credit
market, the past accumulation of external debt continues to bite --asthese countries
continue to operate along the convex part of the inflation-output schedule.
19 The confidence level used is 95%.17
Table 2
Average statistics for the 56 countries: Inflation rate
Monthlydata, 56countries,Source:International Financial SLalistics, IMF
1979-1982 1982- 1990 1990- 1993
Skewness 0.76 0.99 1.06
Variance 0.0006 0.0027 0.008
Mean 0.0145 0.021 0.023
Patterns of skewness across the 56 countries20
1979- 1982 1982- 1990 1990- 1993
Significantly 1 developing,4 developing, 0
negative 1 OECD 2OECD
Non significant 17 developing,8 developing, 14 developing,
skewness 12 OEcD 6 OECD 7 OECD
Significantly 20 developing,26 developing,24 developing,
positive 5 OECD 10 OECD 11 OECD
20The confidence level reported in this table is 95%.18
Table3
Average statistics for the 56countries:Inflation taxrate
Monthlydata, 56countries,Source: International Financial Statistics,IMF
1979- 1982 1982- 1990 1990- 1993
Skewness 0.59 0.71 0.90
Variance 0.0007 0.001 0.0011
Mean 0.0135 0.018 0.018
Patterns of skewness across the 56 countries21
1979- 1982 1982- 1990 1990- 1993
Significantly negative 2 developing, 4 developing, 0
IOECD 2OECD
Non significant 18 developing, 14 developing, 18 developing,
skewness 13 OECD 9 OECD 8 OECD
18 developing, 20 developing, 20 developing.
Significantly positive 4 OECD 7 OECD 10 OECD
21 The confidence level reported in this table is 95%.19
alongthe convex part of the inflation-output schedule.
4.Concluding remarks
Our model can be extended to study the impact of volatility on exchange rate
regimes and on the patterns of financial markets. For example, adverse fiscal shocks,
affecting developing countries, induce a regime switch from a fixed exchange rate
regime to a crawling peg regime or to other regimes that accommodate the induced
inflation. Our discussion predicts that the impact of volatility on expected inflation and
thereby on the interest rate depends on the sophistication of the tax system. and the
ability of the country to use the international credit market. A given increase in output
volatility will induce a larger interest rate increase in countries the tax structure of which
is less developed, and whose external debt is large -.asboth factors increase the
convexity of the output inflation schedule. This underscores the importance of
broadening the tax base, suggesting that fiscal restructuring will have important effects
on the patterns of interest rates.20
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Appendix A
The purpose of this Appendix is to derive Claim I. We focus on approximating a





Considera function y =f(x),and let x be a symmetric randomvariable the mean and
standarddeviation of which are,, respectively.We assume that the support of x




(A2) EEf(x)If(x) + O.5(a )2f"(xo).
Thus,
(A3) f(x)_E[f(x)I(x_xo)f' (xo)+O.5[(x_xo)2 —(a)2]!'' (Xo)
and
(A4)
(1(x) — {(x—xo)f' + 3{(x —x)f' (x0)}20.5[(x —x)2—(a1)2]!" (xo)
-x0)f'(x)}{O.5[(x —x0)2-(a)2]f"(xo)}2 + {O.5[(x
-x)2 -(a)2]f"(x)}
Consequently, applying the symmetry of x,
(A5)
E[{f(x)— E[f(x)]}3] 1.5[E[(x—x0)4 —(a)J]{f' Cr0) 1''
÷{o.51''(x0)}3E[{(x_x0)2 _(a)2}3]
From (A3) we also infer that
(A6) E{(f(x)— RTf(x)])2}(a)2f' (xo)2+ O.52[E{(x
—x)}— (c1)]f'(xo )222
From (A5) and (A6) we infer (using the assumption that the support of x is small to





from which we conclude that22
(AS) sign (p3) =signf,'(x0).
22In making this inference we make use of the fact that for a small support and a
symmetric distribution, EI(x —x0)4
—
(a1)4]>0.Notice also that we implicitly assume
thatf(x0)￿0.23
AppendixB
The purpose of this appendix is to extend the model to n periods. For the sake of
brevity we summarize here the solution in terms of a recursive structure. We assume the
absence of pre commitments, hence in each period a similar problem is solved, where the
past history determines both the present output, and the initial indebtedness. The first
period decisions, regarding yr1 and IL)1, are history in terms of the second period. By
solving the problem in the second period, one can obtain a reduced form of the expected
utility in the second period, denoted by 02.Theexpected utility of the representative










11{(x1 +k)Q1 —(l—1)k+D1 —G1 —B1}+p1[D1-D1J
An internal equilibrium, where both means of financing are used in period 1, leads
to the following first order conditions:
(B3)
8—Eu]] 3—E[C]
SQ1ir1+ 2 /(l+r) 2
dir 8D 1+ 1 = 1
kQ0
' l+r
These conditions together with the budget constraints form a system that
determines the set of policies. While the dimensions of the problem are determined by24
thenumber of periods, theeconomic principlesare the same as in the two-period
example: the split of financing between inflation and external borrowing is done so as to
equate the marginal cost of extra dollar raised. If the credit ceiling binds in the first
period, the inflation is determined according to equation (14). If the fiscal revenue from
direct taxes suffices to cover the fiscal outlays, the inflation tax is zero. For an internal
equilibrium, where both the inflation tax and external borrowing are used, we determine
the optimal configuration of fiscal instruments by applying the above first order
conditions in conjunction with the budget constraints.
We conclude this appendix by reviewing the case where inflation affects the
velocity of circulation. Suppose that the demand for money at time tisgiven by M
=k1Q, wherek depends negatively on expected inflation. The problem facing the
policy maker in period 1 can be restated as
MAX Qi[1_x_ki_(,ri)2]+[1_,rj]koQo+ E'L12J÷
(B") — -







Asin our pervious discussion, one can identify three public finance regimes: for a larger
tax base relative to the fiscal needs, inflation is zero. A drop in the tax revenue or a raise
in the revenue needs moves us to an internal equilibrium, where both the inflation tax
and external borrowing are used. Once the external credit ceiling has been reached,25
dkj
inflationis the onlymeans offinancing. Note that if —< 0, the inflation cost has gone
d,r1
up, increasingthe advantage of using externalborrowing.Hence, a variable velocity
tendsto increase externalborrowing, implying that thedebt ceilingis reached at a
higheroutput. These effectstendtoincrease the convexity of the output-inflation
schedule:inflation willbeloweras long as the debt ceiling has not been reached, but the
creditceiling will be reached at a higher output.Oncethe credit ceilingisreached, a
further drop in output will tend to accelerate inflationdueto the drop in velocity,until
we reach therevenuemaximizinginflation.23
23At thatstage, a further drop inoutputnecessitatesa drop in G.